Heidegger and the Concept of Time
– the turn[s] of a radical epoch[é]

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Abstract: This essay examines the methodological detours that are at work in Martin Heidegger’s writing between the years of 1924 (The Concept of Time) and 1962 (the lecture, “Time and Being”). The aim is to demonstrate how his style of phenomenological interrogation is driven on the basis of multiple moments of epoché, postponement, withdrawal, suspension, detour, etc., despite his resistance to the 'method' of epoché as it was developed by Edmund Husserl. Heidegger’s radical refinements of his own methods constitute a multiplicity of ‘turns’ – inevitably turning back to the issue of the epoché and the temporizing / delay / withholding of that which originally gives Being.

In the early lecture of 1924, entitled “The Concept of Time,” Heidegger inaugurated a programme that formed the backbone of the initial question of his magnum opus, Being and Time (1927). He begins by saying, in a singularly Augustinean tone...

The following reflections are concerned with time. What is time? (The Concept of Time. p.1E).

What ultimately distinguishes Heidegger’s question from that of Augustine is his project to ask about the Being of time without reducing it to a being – something extant. However, this shift is by no means an easy task since the tendency to return to time as an ‘it’ haunts the analyses. Heidegger’s research, in order to be rigorous, had to mobilize itself on the basis of a call for constant vigilance against falling back into its seductive embrace.
Moving from Augustine to Plato, the primary question for Heidegger’s research in the text of *Being and Time* (1927) is to ask about the meaning of Being (*Sein*) – which must, in principle, precede the earlier question concerning the Being of time. And yet, the issue of temporality (Zeitlichkeit) is the frame of his analysis. More precisely, the horizon of time, or Temporality (Temporalität), is the transcendental opening in which the question concerning the meaning of Being is actually articulated. The question of the Being of time can only unfold through an analysis of the meaning of Being in terms of the manifold forms of timeliness in which beings / entities (*Seiendes*) come to presence. But, in a sense, time is not ‘there,’ it is only

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1 …since *Being and Time* structures itself upon a call for – "The Interpretation of Dasein in terms of Temporality, and the Explanation of Time as the Transcendental Horizon for the Question of Being" (SZ. IX). I share the same sentiments as David Wood when he refers to this manifesto in his excellent essay “Reiterating the Temporal: Toward a Rethinking of Heidegger on Time.” Published in Reading Heidegger: Commemorations. Edited by John Sallis. 1993.

“Heidegger’s effective subtitle for Being and Time was: ‘The Interpretation of Dasein in terms of Temporality, and the Explanation of Time as the Transcendental Horizon for the Question of Being.’ I am not alone in having been captivated by these words and their promise” (p.136).

Wood’s fascination with this subtitle plays itself out in the form of a sophisticated elaboration of the multiple pathways that lie open for further investigation. Neither Heidegger nor Derrida have fully exhausted the open horizon of possible routes that suggest themselves in contemporary discourse on pluri-dimensional temporality. The subtitle of *Being and Time* inaugurates a programme that leaves open questions that have yet to be answered. As Wood writes,

“…And yet the book that opened with the big question ends with questions that one would think it ought to have answered: “How is the [ecstatic] temporalizing of temporality to be interpreted? Is there a way which leads from primordial time to the meaning of Being? Does time itself manifest itself as the horizon of Being?” Three and a half years later, in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, and particularly in section 4, the project of fundamental ontology is restated, repeated perhaps for the last time. After that the problem of time and temporality as such recedes. When time reappears, in the lecture “Time and Being” (1962), it is virtually unrecognizable” (pp. 136-7).

Wood’s article is a seminal examination of a variety of different forms of approach to temporality through the reiteration of the spirit of the early Heidegger and a re-reading of the later Heidegger in these terms. While his article provides an extraordinary array of different ways of reiterating the temporal in Heidegger – spanning the years between the lecture of 1924 “The Concept of Time” and the lecture “Time and Being,” 1962 – it is a little surprising that it does not make reference to Heidegger’s tantalizing comment on the epoché (and the problem of phenomenological methodology in general) in reference to his discourse on true time as interplay (*Zuspiel*) in the late lecture of 1962. I shall bring the matter of this omission into the foreground in reference to the issue of the re-iteration that was always at work in Heidegger’s own multiple turns (transformational re-turns), which (somewhat ironically, in view of the apparent distance of his thought from that of his former mentor) brought him closer to the methodological, ontological, and constitutional issues that were the lifelong concerns of Edmund Husserl. See also note 20. Wood outlines his approach as follows:

“I cannot attempt here a reconstruction of Heidegger’s own path, but I would like nonetheless to venture a few remarks on what we could call a temporal repetition of Heidegger’s project. The complexity of the issues involved is formidable, and I cannot claim to have even begun to address them all, let alone to have any adequate articulation of them. But I hope at least to indicate a certain direction of thought.

I begin from three senses of unease: First, that Heidegger’s thinking about time and temporality in the twenties opened up paths not taken, and that we might come to find these paths compelling. Second, that there are some very general philosophical dangers attached to the path Heidegger did take in pursuing the question of Being. Third, and more specifically, at the point at which, arguably, a key temporal concept does emerge – with the *Geschick des*
announced through the coming to thereness of things. Time seems to recede in the giving / extending of presence. This detour through Being to the coming into presence of beings is the defining characteristic of the endless detour / postponement that the question of the Being of time always requires. The question is never direct. It turns out that the question of the meaning of Being is also propelled on the basis of such an interminable detour. The interrogation of Being has to proceed by way of a detour through that being (Dasein) which asks the question of the meaning of Being – thus becoming a kind of phenomenological anthropology. This radically alters the complexion of what may be asked.

*Seins,* the destiny of Being – there is a serious danger of the ratio of darkness to light becoming overpowering. My attitude toward Heidegger is, at least superficially, not unlike Heidegger’s to Husserl, when he continued to read his *Logical Investigations* long after Husserl had moved on” (p. 137).

I want to trace out an inverse path to that of Wood when he writes, “My attitude toward Heidegger is, at least superficially, not unlike Heidegger’s to Husserl, when he continued to read his *Logical Investigations* long after Husserl had moved on.” I have chosen a path that demonstrates ‘how’ even Heidegger had to move on in this regard. Although the idea of tarrying awhile with the early Heidegger has a broad range of exciting possibilities, what is fascinating is that though my narrative approach appears, provisionally, to be in stark contrast to that of Wood’s essay our paths continuously crisscross one another. When one understands the nature of phenomenology as a methodological conception – by way of the continuing movement of transformative reiteration that is none other than the operation of the *epoché* – then this is not really a surprising result. I shall endeavour to demonstrate this by citing sections of Dorion Cairns’s *Conversations with Husserl and Fink.* (1931-1932). Edited by the Husserl-Archives in Louvain, with a Foreword by Richard M. Zaner. Martinus Nijhoff / The Hague / 1976 (*Conversations*). The insertion of a little wholesome gossip from the Husserlian side regarding the Heidegger of the twenties presents a refreshing alternative to the rather one-sided accounts that usually dominate contemporary storytelling in regard to the history of phenomenology. Wood continues,

“I will try to present these sources of unease as at least plausible grounds for a return to Heidegger’s thought of the twenties. The scope of this paper is not limited to a redirecting of our reading of Heidegger. But the breathtaking scope and depth of his own attempts both to rethink the major philosophers of time – particularly Aristotle, Augustine, Kant, and Hegel – as well as the rest of the tradition, make him *indépassable.*

Finally, and most difficult, I want to suggest ways in which it might be possible to think of Being, the a priori, transcendence, the ontological difference, primordiality – all the values which drive Heidegger forward after 1929, and drive him away from time and the temporal – in a very different way.

This last part is the most speculative and the least complete. It represents a preparedness to take what one might call the heroic (perhaps suicidal) course of trying to accommodate and translate all of Heidegger’s “ontological” concerns rather than simply treating them as symptoms of some sort of folly. It would involve saying of these what Heidegger says of the traits of the common conception of time “…they are not simply arbitrary fabrications and inventions. The essence of time must itself make these kinds of conceptions possible and even plausible” [GA 26: 198] (*Ibid*).

Wood’s choice of quotation regarding the “…essence of time” (my emphasis) brings us back firmly to the phenomenological horizon and the accompanying question of method. It raises the question of what kind of discourse on temporality is possible after Derrida. While Heidegger is concerned with unveiling that which must already be presupposed by any discourse on time – as that which is ‘essential’ to it – the absence of any reference to the Husserlian method of ‘eidetic’ reduction is somewhat conspicuous.
1. The *How* of the Articulation of the Question

Perhaps the most vital resource for Heidegger’s discourse on time is Husserl’s *Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness*. Although the core of Husserl’s inquiries on temporality is based on lectures that were given in 1904/5 (with supplements from 1910), the text of *The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness* was not actually published until 1928, one year after the publication of *Being and Time* (Heidegger was the ‘official’ editor of the text, although Edith Stein did the real work).

Husserl’s investigations on temporality establish the matrix in which to articulate the problems of constitution rigorously. Along with the lectures on time-consciousness (the continuing phenomenological analysis of temporality was a preoccupation that never left Husserl’s thought) the mature works: *Cartesian Meditations, Experience and Judgement, Formal and Transcendental Logic*, and *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology* primarily concern themselves with the possibility of a genetic or constitutional phenomenology – according to a *transcendental orientation* – along the different, but intertwined routes

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2 See, in particular, the endnotes of *Being and Time*, where Martin Heidegger acknowledges his indebtedness to Edmund Husserl for allowing him access to unpublished manuscripts.

3 See Dorion Cairns’s *Conversations with Husserl and Fink. IX: Conversation with Fink, 17/8/31*, where Fink describes Husserl’s dissatisfaction with the 1928 publication of *The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness*.

“The difficulty of seeing the place of the earlier time-lectures in the whole system is the chief source of Husserl’s dissatisfaction with their publication at the time with Heidegger’s insufficient introduction” (p. 16).

In a *Further note on conversation with Husserl, 28/8/31*, Cairns writes, “Husserl sorry the time lectures were published as they were. If Fink had been here then, they could have worked them together with the later time lectures” (p. 28).


4 Husserl mentions in *Conversations* that Heidegger is only interested in analyzing an already constituted horizon of different temporal modalities, whereas for Husserl it is incumbent on phenomenology to turn toward the issue of its constitution. Husserl’s focus on deepening the phenomenological analysis of temporality and issues of constitution went hand with his continuing investigations concerning the problem of methodology and the scope of the *epoché*.

XV: *Conversation with Husserl and Fink, A.M. 1/9/31*.

“His project, analysis, etc. on Husserl, is ontological, not constitutive. The acts he speaks of are not zeitige Akte (temporalizing acts), but possible ways of coming to a temporality which is already “there” as otherwise constituted. It is a question of how far the acts of which Heidegger speaks are essential ways of relating to time” (p. 29).

5 As evidenced by Husserl’s constant references to the continuing problem of temporal analysis in his conversations with Dorion Cairns – see *Conversations* and note 3 above.
of egology and the Lifeworld. The paths taken by Husserl are long and convoluted, and the movement is far from linear. The continuous working-out of the thought of epoché throughout the movement of his project of phenomenology demanded this.

With the *Logical Investigations* (1901), Husserl outlined the basis of an early (static) dimension of descriptive phenomenology through the development of a certain style and method – which many of the early phenomenologists considered to be canonical. The rest of his career was taken up with the task of exploring the ‘possibilities’ of phenomenology – in terms of both a pure phenomenology and a

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6 See also Eugen Fink's *Sixth Cartesian Meditation* as endorsed and annotated by Edmund Husserl.  
7 The continuous working-through of the epoché throughout Husserl's career was probably the most fundamental task of phenomenology.  
See IX: *Conversation with Fink*, 17/8/31, where Cairns reports Fink’s comment, "Phenomenology is the coming to self-awareness of the ego over its own activities. As such, [it is] an infinite task" (p. 14).  
XXVII: *Conversation with Husserl and Fink*, 20/11/31, "[It is his [Husserl’s]] conviction that the most important thing about his whole philosophy is the transcendental reduction. He repeated what Fink had told me before, that the phenomenological reduction is something which must be continually repeated in phenomenological work" (p.43).  
See also Husserl’s remarks about a “…phenomenology of the phenomenological reduction” in *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology* (Crisis, Part III B, sec.71, p.247).  
8 Heidegger was primarily inspired by this early work and its phenomenological treatment of categorial intuition. But, for Husserl, it was a work that was highly provisional and which remained open to ongoing phenomenological criticism (see note 10). Wood’s decision to return to Heidegger’s earlier thought and suspending his later orientation in much the same way that Heidegger continued to read Husserl’s early *Logical Investigations* long after Husserl had moved on, traces a path that sets out as a reiteration of Heidegger’s germinal thought on time and takes it in directions that the later Heidegger did not. What follows from his remark that his “…attitude toward Heidegger is, at least superficially, not unlike Heidegger’s to Husserl!” (p. 137 [my emphasis]), resonates with a sense of re-iteration that has much in common with Husserl’s mature constitutional analyses of temporalization and the continuing problem of the epoché (see Wood’s book, *The Deconstruction of Time*). See also Richard Zaner’s Foreword to the Conversations and his reference Dorion Cairns’s account of how Husserl’s lifelong corpus should not be restricted to a linear / chronological reading, but that one should start with the more mature works and, to a certain extent, work backwards in order to appreciate the depths of phenomenology that Husserl’s earlier works do not make fully thematic.  
“Cairns had often insisted – principally in his remarkable lectures at the Graduate Faculty of the New School – that attaining a fair and accurate view of Husserl’s enormously rich and complex body of work required that one begin one’s studies with those works which were written at the peak of Husserl’s philosophical powers, and then one could sensibly turn to the rest of the corpus, always reading it, however, in the light of the former. This order, Cairns maintained, placed the *Cartesian Meditations* first, followed by the *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, only after mastering these, could one meaningfully study *Ideas I* (with a focus on Part II, since Husserl rightly had serious reservations about Part I, which he regarded as too unclear). After this, one could then turn to the largely pre-philosophical (and particularly pre-transcendental) *Logical Investigations*, and then the rest of Husserl’s works, published and unpublished. The present *Conversations* confirm precisely this interpretation, and moreover give the rationale for it: as is amply clear herein, it was only on the light of his labors in the 1920’s culminating in the first two books mentioned above, that Husserl came to a level of genuine philosophical maturity from the perspective of which the earlier studies and inquiries could be viewed systematically and assessed as to their approximation to, or failure fully to achieve, a genuinely philosophical significance” (pp. IX-X).  
See Cairns’s *Notes on Husserl’s conversation*, 27/6/31 (p. 2) regarding the order in which Husserl felt that his work should be studied.
phenomenological philosophy (a double-aspected ‘self-critical’ movement that is announced in the title of the three-volume work: *Ideen zu einerreinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie* [1st Volume: *General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology*, 1913]). The working-through of the critical method of epoché was a task to which Husserl returned again and again. This infinite task was none other than a constant return to beginnings: the question of the ‘how’ of the articulation of the question.

The young Heidegger, on the other hand, appropriated the ‘practical method’

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9 Early in the *Conversations*, Husserl and Fink speak of the highly problematic and very provisional articulation of the epoché in *Ideen 1*. In anticipation of the next meeting Cairns writes, VIII: *Conversation with Husserl and Malvine Husserl, 13/8/31*

“I am to go to him [Husserl] at 11:30 Monday with definite questions. He [Husserl] stated in this connection that there are many difficulties with the phenomenological reduction, difficulties he had not seen at the time of the *Ideen*” (p. 10).

The next conversation with Fink concerns Husserl’s awareness of the sketchy nature of his discourse on the epoché in the *Ideen* and how his research inevitably turned to the many problems associated with its diverse range of applications. Articulating a bewildering variety of different forms of the epoché, Fink finally makes reference to the difficulty of undertaking an epoché that leads to the “transcendental problem of childhood” (IX: *Conversation with Fink, 17/8/31*). It is worthy of note that this is an issue that is foreclosed in Heidegger’s account of the temporal structures that are most fundamental to Dasein since he begins with the finite time that is underscored by Being-towards-death. Clearly, children come to learn that they are going to die, thus Heidegger’s analytic of Dasein is none other than that of ‘adult’ Dasein. Husserl was far more attuned to the problem of genesis / constitution than Heidegger (who remained caught up in the discourse of the pre-transcendental *Logical Investigations*, which had not yet even begun to develop the method of phenomenological reduction) while Husserl had moved on. For Husserlian phenomenology, the key to the problem of constitution resides with the continuing development of the method of epoché.

IX: *Conversation with Fink, 17/8/31*

“To a question, Fink replied that Heidegger had not worked on Husserl in this matter, but vice versa. Everything which Heidegger takes over from Husserl loses the ‘methodological sense’ which it has for Husserl” (pp. 13-14).

Later, Cairns writes – XXVII: *Conversation with Husserl and Fink, 20/11/31*

“He [Husserl] said that neither Heidegger nor Becker nor Kaufmann understood the phenomenological reduction” (p. 43).

10 This infinite task is none other than an infinite re-iteration of phenomenological questions that always remain open to further analysis. As Richard Zaner points out in his Foreword to *Conversations*, “One of the most striking features of Husserl’s lifelong effort to establish a truly foundational discipline of philosophical criticism is here exhibited quite dramatically – and often to both Cairns’s and Fink’s surprise, if not dismay. Hardly any insight or result is regarded by Husserl, even at this late date in his career, as definitively established: He (and perfere his readers) finds it necessary continually to re-examine, research again and again, terrain which most of his followers and critics would like to regard as “Husserl’s established views,” but which Husserl himself is never wont to accept as established and closed to further discussion...every effort, and claim, to know inherently require phenomenological explicative criticism, and that itself necessitates continuous *transcendental* self-criticism” (p. XI).

See also notes 7 and 8 above. The thought of a ‘phenomenology of phenomenology’ traces itself throughout Husserl's work. See, in particular, the Conclusion (‘conclusion’ being somewhat of a misnomer in this context) to Husserl's *Cartesian Meditations* – which I quote in my article “*Différance Beyond Phenomenological Reduction [Epoché]?*” *The Warwick Journal of Philosophy*, Vol.2, Issue 2. 1989, P.68). See also Husserl's *Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology* and the call for a “phenomenology of the phenomenological reduction” (*Crisis*. Part III B, Sec.71, P.247) – which translates as a ‘reduction of the reduction.’ See also notes 7 and 13.
of phenomenology (ready-made – as developed in the *Logical Investigations*, which was primarily ‘static’ and prior to the thematization of the phenomenological reduction, but which opened up the pathway to the later genetic analyses) without Husserl’s obsessive drive for an ongoing critical examination of its limits. This is not to say that Heidegger was in any way careless, but it does suggest an over-confidence regarding the degree to which the methods of phenomenology had been formulated and understood. Yet, he was unable to ‘complete’ the project of pursuing and *authentically* determining the meaning of Being as it was ‘initially’ raised in *Being and Time* (1927). During this phase, Heidegger seems to have had little interest in Husserl’s later discourse on the *epoché* and his constant return to the question of its scope. This is intriguing since the radical orientation of the analyses of *Being and Time* can be said to take place against the background of the transcendental-phenomenological reduction. It is not surprising that the text of *Being and Time* constantly tends toward a return to the critical question regarding the ‘how’ of the ‘articulation’ of the ‘*question* of the meaning of Being.’ There is no closure, only a further deepening. Husserl’s obsession clearly caught up with Heidegger. The reason for this has to do with the non-linear manner in which phenomenological interrogation actually unfolds itself.

In the lecture entitled, “Time and Being” (1962 – published in *On Time and Being [OTB]*) we see a reversal of sorts – although it is not simply a reversal of names or the undermining of an old hierarchy, since its revolutionary movement was already anticipated, to a certain extent, in *Being and Time*. The moment that Heidegger brought to light the question of the transcendental attitude of *Temporalität* in 1927, he actually undermined the limits of his initial task. The question of Being owes its very possibility to time. It appears that time is the primordial horizon of all horizons of Being.

The task of ‘formulating the question of the meaning of Being’ has to proceed by way of a detour. This detour initially involves an analysis of that *being for whom Being is in question* [*Dasein*]. With the examination of *Dasein as care* – *Sorge*, the structurality of which is fundamentally ‘temporal’ – the detour is not a mere delay in the passage of the guiding question of *Being and Time*. The interruption is not simply surmounted, and what is unearthed is not merely incorporated into the limits of the initial project. It becomes ‘interminably’ postponed. The delay of a certain *epoché*
defines the whole movement and direction[s] of *Being and Time*.\textsuperscript{11}

With the deepening of the thought of the ‘question’ of the meaning of Being with respect to time, from the standpoint of the transcendental horizon of *Temporalität* – which is the pivot of the text as a whole – the very task is transfigured. In one sense, it may be suggested that Heidegger’s research is not strictly existential in orientation, at this point, but more formal / essential, although one can always fall back on the phenomenological relation between existence and ekstasis. Being always has to be thought in terms of time – but one can argue that the question of time is the principal problem, not Being. The terms Being and time are not tied together in a symmetrical relationship. Time cannot necessarily be thought – irreducibly – in terms of Being.

It is for these reasons that Heidegger could not continue to ask the Augustinian question “What, then, is time?” (*Confessions*. Book 11, sec.14, p.263), since temporality is always a condition of the copula rather than the other way round. Although Heidegger’s orientation by way of the question “what ‘is’ time?” is to ask about its Being, rather than to ask about time as a being, his analyses demonstrate that one first has to ask about Being before one can ask about the Being of time – and that Being is to be explicated in terms temporality. Furthermore, has he not shown us that one first has to ask about the being that asks the question of the meaning of Being? This extended detour, by determining the actual scope of what may be asked, articulates a double withdrawal – methodologically, on the one hand, and ontologically, on the other – and together, they raise certain issues of constitution. It also marks a return in the form of a Moebius Strip\textsuperscript{12} (or loop) through Sorge (care) as

\textsuperscript{11} The lecture courses upon which the texts *History of the Concept of Time* (lecture course of 1925) and *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology* (lecture course of 1927) are based are a clear indication of this *epochal* detour or postponement that could not be recuperated. The former gives a thoroughgoing account of Heidegger’s interpretation of Husserl’s phenomenology and the second is based on material that was withdrawn from the publication of *Being and Time* (which was published as the First Half) in order that it could be more thoroughly worked out as the basis of a Second Half, which never materialized. See note 16.

\textsuperscript{12} Wood uses the analogue of the Moebius Strip to point out the intertwining of the transcendental and empirical (see “Reiterating the Temporal: Toward a Rethinking of Heidegger on Time”), “The transcendental, if you like, is nowhere else but in the empirical (see Merleau-Ponty’s *Visible and the Invisible*). The best model for this unity of absolute distinctness at a time and wider continuity, is offered, I believe, by the Moebius strip (a flat ribbon, twisted once and joined in a circle) at any point of which there are two quite distinct sides, which are yet, when traced through, seen to be only a single surface. This neither proves nor explains anything, but it illustrates how one might begin to think *transcendence within temporality*” (p.157).

Wood’s usage is complementary to my own, especially in addition to the *a chronology* of my reading of Husserl, which finds its inspiration in the old master’s directive to Dorion Cairns. See Richard Zaner’s Foreword to *Conversations*, note 8 above.
the temporalizing horizon in which Being first comes into question. However, since Being always already has to be thought in terms of time, both of which withdraw in the coming to presence of being, this project must defer its own fulfillment – indefinitely.

Regardless of whether or not the question of the Being of time was implicitly at work in Heidegger’s thinking as a continuation of the original question of 1924 – along with the slightest hint of the spectre of time as an ‘it’ – one may argue that he was inevitably drawn back to a more Husserlian type of problematic with respect to the how of the articulation of the question.13

Existentialism was born out of phenomenology – and, in the case of Being and Time, we see that the young Heidegger’s predispositions informed the manner and direction of his utilization of phenomenological methods. One should not overlook the theological background to the reading of Husserl in Heidegger’s development of phenomenological-ontological inquiry – which restores the questions of Being, death

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13 This is the case since even time, as the horizon of the explication of Being, must give itself up to ‘constitutional’ analysis. As already stated, questions regarding temporization and constitution go hand in hand with the continuing development of the epoché – a phenomenology of the epoché. XXIV: Conversation with Husserl and Fink, 9/11/31

“Husserl said that at the time of the 1905 time-lectures he had not yet come upon the phenomenological reduction, but that these lectures were what urged him on to think of the phenomenological reduction. This first came to paper – in a primitive form – the following summer in Seefeld. He spoke of publishing the five lectures of 1908 in the next but one of the Jahrbuch” (p. 38).

Of course, Husserl is referring to the developments in the time-lectures of 1905 that led to the seminal thought of the phenomenological reduction in the lectures that were eventually published under the title: The Idea of Phenomenology (see bibliography). With the publication of Husserl’s Ideen I in 1913, there ‘began’ a systematic account of the method of epoché, which gradually turned into the most fundamental problem of phenomenology. In this regard, see Eugen Fink’s Sixth Cartesian Meditation: The Idea of a Transcendental Theory of Method – with textual notations by Edmund Husserl. The translator, Ronald Bruzina writes, “The Sixth Meditation is not a treatise on human experience but a transcendental theory of method, a phenomenology of phenomenology” (p. Ii). See section 5: “Phenomenologizing as the action of reduction,” where Fink writes,

“The phenomenology of the phenomenological reduction is the first problem of the transcendental theory of method – “first” indeed not only as the problem that necessarily introduces things, but also as the fundamental problem. The phenomenological reduction is not an arrangement of cognitive practices that one simply has to execute in order to enter into the phenomenological attitude, and then can be put behind oneself, but is precisely the basic philosophical act that first antecedently sets up the possibility of philosophizing, in the sense that all concretely conducted philosophizing is only a development of reduction itself. In this very same way, now the phenomenology of the phenomenological reduction already implies the whole transcendental theory of method. All later particular methodological reflections are in principle nothing but the unfolding and developing of methodological consequences that are already latent as such in reflection upon the phenomenological reduction” (p. 29).

Fink continues,

“The theory of method of the phenomenological reduction…has to do not only with the “why” of the action of reducing, but also, and above all, with the “how” of phenomenologizing itself” (p. 39).
and anxiety. To be sure, Heidegger’s project is not a restatement of an old onto-
theology, given that he is deeply critical of its history, but it does take his own
research in a different direction to that of Husserl’s phenomenology. One might even
suggest that Heidegger’s work is not strictly ‘phenomenological’ (as Husserl himself
understood this expression). However, this would be to confuse the aim with the
language. Heidegger can be considered rightly as the father of existentialism precisely
because of the rigour of his application of the language of phenomenology in
unearthing the existential horizon. The falling-away from the Husserlian project is a
kind of falling-upwards, but there are always problems associated with any kind of
fall.

With the lecture “Time and Being,” we find a fundamental example of
Heidegger’s turn (kehre) which he could never have foreseen, since the method of
phenomenology itself only gradually informed him about the scope of what he could
‘authentically’ articulate. This makes itself felt with particular force in the fascinating
closing remarks of his address where he expresses the problem of having conducted
the lecture by means of propositional statements.

In effect, the question “what is time?” always has to give way to another type
of question: how is it with time? Heidegger’s entire phenomenology is an exemplary
case of a continuing struggle to trace out a methodology that has been motivated by
this awareness. The form of his discourse is none other than a de-con-struction of the
classical or vulgar concept of time in order to unearth the authentic living resonance
of timeliness.

14 Husserl’s comment in Conversations – that Heidegger had not escaped a theological orientation and
that the popularity of his philosophy at that time was partly due to the way in which a certain
theological tendency was at work in connection to the mystical zeitgeist that had much to do with
World War 1.

VIII: Conversation with Husserl and Malvine Husserl, 13/8/31
“…a careful reading of Heidegger…showed him [Husserl] how far Heidegger was from him.
He laid this to Heidegger never having freed himself completely from his theological
prejudices, and to the weight of the war on him. The war and ensuing difficulties drive men
into mysticisms. This too accounts for Heidegger’s popular success. But [is not] Heidegger by
far the most important of the non-Husserlian philosophers today? His work bears the mark of
genius. Before thus reading Heidegger he had often said to Heidegger: You and I are die
Phänomenologie” (p. 9).
2. Time, Deconstruction and the Evolution of Method

Jacques Derrida’s neo-Heideggerian project of deconstruction, in certain fundamental ways, returns the method of phenomenology to itself stripped of the existential character of any particular ontological orientation. It is the later Heidegger who provides the resources through which Derrida discourses with the earlier incarnation. There is some indication that this also involves a detour through Husserl. Conversely, with reference to the intimacy of Anwesenheit (presence) and Gegenwart (the present) as the linchpin of the deconstruction of phenomenology, Derrida reads Husserl through Heidegger. Derrida’s analyses are already based in a plurivocal (dialogical) phenomenological sphere.

Derrida appropriates Heidegger while displacing the questions of Being, temporality and historicity by re-situating them according to a modified perspective: the quasi-transcendental field of writing / archi-writing. There is a sense in which he reads Heidegger with the more ‘formal’ eye of the Husserlian. The re-reading begins in existential-phenomenology and goes beyond only by ‘returning’ to phenomenology in a manner that radicalizes / re-organizes its orientation. Such a ‘beyond’ requires examination for it has very definite limits.\footnote{Derrida questions Heidegger’s notion of a ‘vulgar concept’ of time and the assumption that there is ultimately a more authentic temporality that awaits disclosure. “...perhaps there is no ‘vulgar concept of time.’ The concept of time, in all its aspects, belongs to metaphysics, and it names the domination of presence. Therefore we can only conclude that the entire system of metaphysical concepts, throughout its history, develops the so-called ‘vulgarity’ of the concept of time (which Heidegger, doubtless, would not contest), but also that an other concept of time cannot be opposed to it, since time in general belongs to metaphysical conceptuality. In attempting to produce this other concept, one rapidly would come to see that it is constructed out of other metaphysical or ontotheological predicates” (“Ousia and Grammé,” Margins. p.63).}

Derrida’s strategy of displacement with respect to temporal terminology has an important critical function for such language, but the ‘big implication’ that this language has already exhausted itself is highly problematic. As Wood writes in The Deconstruction of Time \cite{DT}, “...the belief that a postmetaphysical account of temporality can rise again after Derrida must surely be encouraged by his inability to keep temporally loaded terms out of his analysis” \cite{DT. p.113}. Also, see Wood’s article “Reiterating the Temporal: Toward a Rethinking of Heidegger on Time” where he states that his “principle of principles” is based upon the thought “that it is always too early to abandon time.” Indeed, one may go further and add that not only is it the case “…that it is always too early to abandon time” (my emphasis) it is always already too late! – since time is always already at play.

“The obvious way in which to rethink Being, the ontological difference, etc., is to follow the path already beaten by Derrida, who offers us powerful strategies for undermining both the character of the primitive and the primordial as well as the textual drive that takes us in these directions. Derrida’s classical gestures have centered around a kind of parodic substitution of an impossible origin within a transcendental framework. This is the language of
There is nothing outside the text, which is to say that everything that is is by virtue of the opening up of structure and the structurality of the opening through which it is articulated (con-textualization: co-founding, con-founding, etc.). As a deeply sedimented and yet mobile matrix, the theme of ‘textuality’ (in which sociality, inter-communality, discourse, etc., may be understood as textual forms grafted upon one another) performs a similar role for Derrida as the discourse on the *Lebenswelt* – opened up by the implementation of the transcendental-phenomenological reduction or epoché – does for Husserl in the *Crisis*.

To return to the Heideggerian trace in Derrida’s thought: that there is nothing outside the text is not a reduction of Being. It is the opening up of the sense or horizon of the possibility of its articulation, which is, in a sense, prior to the question of Being. However, it is only through the working out of the ‘question’ of the meaning of Being that this deeper horizon is unearthed as a task for thinking. The urgency of the question announces itself only after a careful phenomenological investigation of the problematic of the question of Being in terms of the problem of ‘method’ itself: the how of the articulation of the question. This is a task that Heidegger took up and which ultimately undermined the limits of the original aims of *Being and Time*. The promise of a second part to this project, as announced and anticipated in *Being and Time*, was never fulfilled – nor could it be, as Heidegger himself remarks in his author’s preface to the seventh German edition of this text.

\[differance\], trace, supplement and so on. In “*Ousia and Grammé*” Derrida explicitly repudiates the idea of another, primordial time that could underwrite ordinary time. In doing so, he brings ruin to much of the language of the later Heidegger. But of course part of what is questioned is the very idea of the transcendental (or quasi-transcendental) framework. I want to suggest a way of expanding the erosion of the transcendental other than this substitutive displacement. This would attempt to reopen the field of intratemporal constitution by pursuing forms of interreferential and articulatory complexity. In a graded series of levels, this would involve attempts to articulate the temporal forms of transition, dehiscence, difference, repetition, interweaving, entanglement, superimposition. As well as the Derridian displacement of the origin (in favor of repetition, and differance), I am suggesting we pursue the possibilities of a multiplicity of temporal series, of the complexity of their constitution, of the capacity for crossdetermination of one series by another, etc. Such an account will take considerable analytical work, and I cannot take it further here. What drives this thinking is what I shall call my principle of all principles – that it is always too soon to abandon the resources of the temporal. And the continued use of terms like horizon, spacing, transcendence, even ecstasies, requires of us at the very least a textual circling back, to break open and articulate their temporality” (p. 155-6).

I examine the issue of Derrida’s treatment of Husserl’s texts on time and those of Heidegger in significant detail in an article entitled, “The End of Time and the Beginning of Writing: Phenomenology and the Genealogy of Early Deconstructive Technique” (forthcoming).
While the previous editions have borne the designation ‘First Half,’ this has now been deleted. After a quarter of a century, the second half could no longer be added unless the first were to be presented anew. Yet the road it has taken remains even today a necessary one, if our Dasein is to be stirred by the question of Being (Being and Time, p.17).

The “road,” path, or way “remains a necessary one.” The question of method itself is, perhaps, ‘the’ phenomenological task. And, it is the methodical care with which Heidegger’s magnum opus unfolds itself in these terms that justifies its greatness. With the addition of his later views, however, should there not also be some reference to the necessity of Dasein being ‘stirred by the question of time?’

Regardless of any specific hierarchical value that may be attached to one side or the other, Heidegger’s writing is a stirring demonstration that time and Being must be thought together.

Much of Derrida’s writing may be seen as a vigorous response to these issues – particularly in view of his readings of Husserl’s phenomenology, which can, unfortunately, often confuse as much as they illuminate. However, his re-writing of Husserlian themes presents a fascinating spectrum of ideas – all of which are ripe for critical re-reading. But, this is not to suggest that this critique should be primarily concerned with the task of returning to Husserl (as a return to the same) by undoing the Heideggerian traces that weave themselves throughout Derrida’s re-readings – as if they somehow contaminated the purity and integrity of an ‘original’ text. There is a powerful aspect to deconstruction which, through a Heideggerian lens-piece, has the capacity to further refine Husserl’s self-professed drive to leave no philosophical stone unturned in the exploration of the question of method (hodos – way, road). The epoché remains as the linchpin, but not only as a methodological consideration, since it also resonates with an even more profound sense, of which the later Heidegger is also very much aware. Derrida also reflects this understanding in his comment at the end of his Introduction to Husserl’s “Origin of Geometry” (p.153) about the reduction or epoché having been thought in the mere “…lacklustre guise of a technique…” and celebrates its deeper sense as a pure movement of delay. The epoché [is] temporization. It is the very movement of the methodological epoché that inevitably raises this to the level of a theme – where bracketing is none other than the signification of a certain kind of postponement. Heidegger’s discourse on Being by way of the being that asks the question of the meaning of Being is the mark of such a
3. Being is the Gift of Time-Space – Including Time and Space themselves

In the lecture “Time and Being,” Heidegger writes,

Time-space...is the name for the openness which opens up in the mutual self-extending of futural approach, past and present. This openness exclusively and primarily provides the space in which space as we usually know it can unfold. The self-extending, the opening up, of future, past and present ([OTB] p.14).

This opening up of the threefold dimensionality of “futural approach, past and present” is that which also provides the extension of time “as we usually know it.” The sense of extending here, as a ‘prespatial’ opening which makes room for space, can be traced back to 1927 (the lecture course that was eventually published under the title of The Basic Problems of Phenomenology [1975]16) and Heidegger’s account of

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16 The lecture course of 1927, which came to be known as The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie), is based on material that was to be published in the original Being and Time as division 3 of Part 1 (entitled: “Time and Being”), but which Heidegger withdrew at the last moment in order that it could be revised, refined, and eventually published as Part 2. See, in particular, the opening paragraphs (p. 118) of Friedrich-Wilhelm Von Hermann’s article, “Being and Time and The Basic Problems of Phenomenology” (published in Reading Heidegger: Commemorations [ed. John Sallis]) – a fascinating essay that gives a rigorous account of the history of both texts.

It is significant that Derrida’s essay, entitled "Ousia and Grammé – a note on a note from Being and Time" (Margins of Philosophy), takes up the project concerning an analysis of Hegel’s philosophy and, in particular, Aristotle's discourse on time – that was originally announced by Heidegger, but which Derrida maintains was never fulfilled. It is true that this analysis was supposed to be presented in the Second Half of Being and Time, which never materialized, but it did in fact emerge in the lecture course that was eventually published under the title: The Basic Problems of Phenomenology. However, this text was not available to Derrida at the time that he wrote "Ousia and Grammé" because Heidegger's text (based on a series of lectures given in 1927) was not actually published until 1975. "Ousia and Grammé" was published in 1968.

Heidegger’s research on Aristotle’s discourse on the now (nun) had a massive impact on the further detours around the question of time that his analyses were forced to take – culminating in the text, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, on the one hand, and on the other, the detour through language and the shift in emphasis with respect to Being and Time from the point of view of “Time and Being.”
the meaning of extension and continuity (in terms of their relation to motion) in Aristotle’s *Physics*. Extension is irreducible to spatiality in the usual sense.

Heidegger writes,

Extension and continuity are already implicit in motion. They are earlier than motion in the sense of being apriori conditions of motion itself... Extension here has a broader sense than specifically spatial dimension. Motion follows continuity, and continuity follows extendedness (*The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*. [BPP] p.243).

The most significant senses of extension for Heidegger are: stretching, giving and deferring – which are all presupposed in any discourse on the threefold play of the three ekstases. In the early language of Heidegger, the threefold is given through retaining, enpresentation and expecting – whose correlates in Husserl’s discourse on temporality are: retention, primal impression and protention.

The transcendental sense of *Temporalität* (as expressed by Heidegger) names the standpoint that focuses on the intertwining of the three ekstases: the giving that is constitutive of the horizon of *Zeitlichkeit* in which things abide in a ‘present,’ which by being already outside itself (stretched) has its flowing continuity. The ‘now’ is founded through this flux (and in a peculiar sense the contemporaneity) of the three horizons of Temporality – the ‘giving’ of each to each in their communality of differentiation. This refers us to a fourfold – the ‘interplay’ [Zuspiel] of the three ekstases.

Heidegger tells us that...

...the unity of time’s three dimensions consists in the interplay of each toward each. This interplay proves to be the true extending, playing in the very heart of time, the fourth dimension, so to speak – not only so to speak, but in the nature of the matter ("Time and Being," *OTB*, p.15).

This play or interplay is not an aftereffect. The extending of the ekstases toward one another is that which originally constitutes time as a stretching-out of past, present and future. This is the fourth dimension of time – which is not to be thought as an increment to the other three dimensions since it actually names that which originally makes the threefold of time possible. Heidegger calls this dimension ‘true time,’ yet it lacks any resemblance to time as we usually know it. It is not ‘in’ time as
some kind of process that has duration. It is not of the order of successivity. As radical as this orientation appears, it recognizes a deep dimension / horizon that Husserl had already articulated in his lectures on immanent time consciousness as ‘Primordial Flux.’ The principal theme, when the transcendent and the empirical meet the transcendental (for they are already entangled) is *intra*-play.

The traditional disjunction between time and space is deeply problematical. Temporality and spatiality cannot be articulated adequately within the bounds of the classic dyad. The 20th century distinguished itself in the phenomenological-deconstruction of the differences that have traditionally separated discourse on time (as an order of successions) from that of a spatial order (as an order of coexistences). The conceptual framework of Einstein’s theory of relativity is exemplary in this regard to the extent that space and time should even be treated as one word: spacetime.

Heidegger gives us a little conundrum to think about when he writes…

...true time appears as the ‘It’ of which we speak when we say: It gives Being. The destiny in which It gives Being lies in the extending of time. Does this reference show time to be the ‘It’ that gives Being? By no means. For time itself remains the gift of an ‘It gives’ whose giving preserves the realm in which presence is extended. Thus the ‘It’ continues to be undetermined, and we ourselves continue to be puzzled (“Time and Being,” *OTB*, p.17).

The “It” about which Heidegger speaks – which remains “undetermined” – points to the necessity of a vertical discourse that resists reduction to propositional statements and which necessarily resists reduction to the divide that traditionally

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17 This is also the case for Merleau-Ponty’s discourse on time as *chiasm*, which was formulated in late 1960. See *The Visible and the Invisible: Time and Chiasm – November, 1960*

“The *Stiftung* [founding/establishment] of a point of time can be transmitted to the others without “continuity” without ”conservation,” without fictitious ”support” in the psyche the moment that one understands time as chiasm. Then past and present are *Ineinander*, each enveloping-enveloped – and that itself is the flesh” (p.267-8. Translation modified).

What Merleau-Ponty says about the enveloping-enveloped structural intertwining of the present and the past is also true of their relation to the future. Chiasm expresses the vertical intertwining (*Ineinander*) of the three ekstases of time. Time is understood as invaginated flesh, where past, present, and future are offered up to one another as folds in the same flesh (which has certain spatializing resonances). The flesh as fold – in its folding-in upon itself – is the un-folding of differentiation within a horizon of belonging.
separates the issue of structure from that of genesis.\textsuperscript{18} The only key to this opening appears to be the way in which he further radicalizes discourse on time.

If we are to understand the complications that announce themselves in Heidegger’s later temporal orientation (especially with reference to his discourse on \textit{es gibt} [it-gives] and \textit{Ereignis} [appropriation]), we need to return to \textit{Being and Time} – where Dasein is characterized as \textit{Sorge} [care]. Dasein is an extended-extending comportment that is generally busy in the world; it is primarily \textit{concerned} in the unity of its projection. And, as Heidegger writes,

\begin{quote}
\end{quote}

This shift from mere / vulgar time to temporality, from Zeit to Zeitlichkeit – as “…[t]he primordial unity of the structure of care…” is the basis of the fundamental distinction that leads to the transcendent horizon of Temporality as Temporalität. The following passage introduces the pivotal thought of Temporalität in \textit{Being and Time}. Temporalität means timeliness (not, as one might have imagined, Zeitlichkeit).

Heidegger writes,

\begin{quote}
...the way in which Being and its modes and characteristics have their meaning determined primordially in terms of time, is what we shall call its \textit{Temporal} determinateness (seine \textit{temporale} Bestimmtheit). Thus the fundamental ontological task of Interpreting Being as such includes working out the Temporality (Temporalität) of Being. In the exposition of the problematic of Temporality the question of the meaning of Being will first be concretely answered (\textit{BT}. p.40 / H.19. Translation modified).
\end{quote}

Consider this further reference to Temporalität, in \textit{The Basic Problems of Phenomenology}.

What has to be shown is this: temporality is the condition of the possibility of all understanding of being; \textit{being is understood and conceptually apprehended by means of time}. When temporality functions as such a condition we call it Temporality [\textit{Temporalität}] (p.274).

\textsuperscript{18} As already indicated in note 4, Heidegger’s early work lacks a ‘constititutional’ dimension to his analysis of temporality. His concern with the unconcealment of what is ostensibly a pre-constituted nexus of different temporal modalities inevitably had to turn toward the issue of their constitution, thus bringing him closer to the Husserlian perspective.
Temporalität names a transcendental orientation that requires a strict method of articulation. This brings us back to the whole phenomenological question of method.

Although Heidegger maintains that the “...expression ‘phenomenology’ signifies primarily a methodological conception” (BT. p.50. H.27/28) and that “...it does not characterize the what of the objects of philosophical research as subject-matter, but rather the how of that research” (Ibid), it is not so clear that he actually appreciated the full import of this. The real force of the thought of phenomenology ‘as possibility’ (BT, pp.62/3 H.38/9 and the last paragraphs of “My Way to Phenomenology” [OTB]) only makes itself felt in Heidegger’s writing after the analyses of Being and Time are already well underway. The fulfillment of the project as originally outlined in this text finds itself deferred again and again. The similar, but non-identical themes of withholding / detour / deferral / suspension, which are announced in Husserl’s various applications of the methodological epoché, express different aspects of the unfolding of dimensionality itself (which Derrida re-reads as spacing, temporizing, tracing, etc.) – dynamics that are already operative at the heart of time, history, Being and presence. This was to become a focal point in Heidegger’s later thinking.19

Consider the following reference to the expression epoché in Heidegger’s lecture “Time and Being.”

The history of Being means destiny of Being in whose sendings both the sending and the It which sends forth hold back with their self-manifestation. To hold back is, in Greek, epoché. Hence we speak of the epochs of the destiny of Being. Epoch does not mean here a span of time in occurrence, but rather the fundamental characteristic of sending, the actual holding-back of itself in favour of the discernibility of the gift, that is, of Being with regard to the grounding of beings. The sequence of epochs in the destiny of Being is not accidental, nor can it be calculated as necessary. Still, what is appropriate shows itself in the destiny, what is appropriate shows itself in the belonging together of the epochs. The epochs overlap each other in their sequence so that the original sending of Being as presence is more and more obscured in different ways (“Time and Being” [OTB], p.9).

19 As indicated in notes 7, 10 and 13, Husserl became more and more focused on this issue as ‘the’ fundamental problem of phenomenology – phenomenology of the phenomenological reduction. See Conversations, Cartesian Meditations, and Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. Heidegger had to reach a similar point eventually.
Heidegger’s turn to the ‘holding back’ of the self-manifestation of “both the sending and the It which sends forth” concerns the essential recession and deferment of presencing before that which comes to presence. This is the **epoché** at the very heart of Being – its temporization.\(^{20}\) The methodological correlate to this **epoché** is a turn toward that which “shows itself in the belonging together of the epochs” – the destiny of Being. However, the aim to reveal the essential intertwining of the epochs is tempered by the limits of such an **epoché**, which raises the issue of deferment / delay to the level of a theme in its own right. When Heidegger writes that the “epochs overlap each other in their sequence so that the original sending of Being as presence is more and more obscured in different ways,” his discourse on presencing bumps up against the limits of what may be asked.

It is here that Derrida’s strategem and quasi-concept: **différance** announces both its relevance and its urgency. By naming the intertwining (belonging-together) of difference and deferral his project of deconstruction turns to a non-situated dimension of phenomenology that is as much Husserlian as it is Heideggerian. Such a turn, by embracing both chance and necessity, is a radical re-turn – a movement of appropriation that traces out the signature of an interminable delay.

Like Husserl’s phenomenology, Heidegger’s project is not only mobilized on the basis of such a turn, it traces out innumerable turns within the horizon of an **epoché** that is the pre-condition of the famous (singular) ‘turn’ by which we have come to understand the development of his thought on the way from Being to language.

Fundamentally, the phenomenological **epoché** extends beyond being merely a method. The constellation of constitutional dynamics (where de-con-struction / Abbau is inseparably bound up with construction [re-construction] / Aufbau) to which it refers is none other than the temporizing of temporality, the spacing of spatiality and the ‘holding-back’ or ‘withdrawal’ of presence in the ‘giving’ of presence. The value of this orientation lies in the primary form of the **epoché** itself – a signification that

\(^{20}\) To return to note 1 of this essay in the form of a Moebius Strip it is surprising that Wood’s scholarly essay, which re-thinks Heidegger’s re-thinking on time (spanning the same period (1924-1962) as my article), does not really address the issue of phenomenological methodology and the pivotal reference to the **epoché** – in relation to the reiteration of the temporal in Heidegger – in his reading of the latter’s lecture, “Time and Being.” Surely, it would have given more force to his call for the urgency of such re-iteration and his engagement with the question of the possible scope of ‘how’ one might work toward rethinking Heidegger on time. Such a re-thinking would surely be none other than the signature of the re-application of a form of **epoché** with all its temporizing resonance…(go to note 1)
not only expresses the manner in which phenomenology unfolds, but also points to the primordial form of the articulation of Being and Time themselves.

The intimate association between epoché and epoch signs itself in the intertwining of history (Historie and Geschichte) in historicity (Geschichtlichkeit) – where Historizität, in Husserlian terms, is a natural analogue to the horizon of Temporalität with respect to its relations to Zeit and Zeitlichkeit. The epoché is a rupture (spacing) that maintains and a postponement (temporization) that retains – where such maintenance and retention are always, to some extent, transformational. As temporization, it is a holding-back (a deferral) that makes manifest that which is hidden. As spacing, it is simultaneously a holding-together and a holding apart – a closing that opens. The epoché is also the signature of the dissolution of the apparent discreteness of spacing and temporizing – just as it announces a suspension that gives, traces meaning without a template and constitutes movement without being reducible to movement in itself.
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